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Abstract
In the present paper, we have defined a physical event as an invariant replacement of a
structural form, possessing a finite space-time region which emerges as a unification of the
uncertainty principle and the quantum sate. To reach this concept, we have first unearthed
and then criticized two related conjectures relying on the foundation of the current physics
which are that: (1) there is an operational-based prior space-time frame in which physical
events evolve continuously; and (2) the events are understood based on a pure two-valued
logic of rational-reason. We have concluded that the presented conceptual frame supports
(i) a time operator having a domain (0, 2pi). In addition, it implies that: (ii) the dynamical
variables of a physical event are the functional faculties as the content of the structural form
of the event; and (iii) every physical event needs a finite time for realization.
Keywords Continuous kinematical and dynamical descriptions · Quantum state · Uncertainty principle ·
Physical event · Structural form · Rational reason
1 Introduction
Monumental improvements in physics have usually resulted from a philosophical perspective on its foundation.
Interpreting the motion of physical systems in phase-space and the idea of (the principle of) action has given
rise to analytical mechanics; a strict and robust examination of both measurement and observation led A.
Einstein to a new comprehension of space-time,and thus, to the theory of special relativity; and in contrast
to the prevalent view at that time, assuming the disintegration of energy discreetly suggested M. Planck to
reach his formula of black body radiation, which is also the origin of quantum theory.
In a similar manner, after W. Heisenberg and E. Schrödinger published their works [1, 2, 3] on dynamics
of quantum systems, a debate about the physical status of the Schrödinger wave function, which has been
associated with the uncertainty principle, arose among physicists, which again had a philosophical character
and still maintains its vitality. Additionally related to this debate, many studies have been dedicated to
giving a reasonable and satisfactory foundation to quantum mechanics, especially to its fundamental features,
such as the quantum state of a system, the measurement process and the uncertainty principle [4]. When the
quantum information field emerged, these issues gained a vital importance; especially the dynamic of the
measurement process and the entanglement of (the quantum state of) physical systems respectively became
cornerstones for the computations in quantum circuits and quantum information. Being directly related with
the measurement process of obtaining information through a quantum circuit, the uncertainty principle has
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attracted again attention to itself in the context of the error-disturbance [5, 6] and entropic measurement
[7, 8, 9]. In addition, the compatibility of the quantum-state assignments of the parties and the entanglement
problem have highlighted the physical status of the quantum state as a problem about the foundation of
the quantum information [10, 11, 12]. Therefore, we point out that the debate on the foundation, or on the
fundamental elements of quantum theory at the beginning is still indispensable for any of those fields taking
quantum theory as the starting point, such as quantum information and computation, and the quantum
logic fields. Because a consensus on the physical status of the fundamental elements has not been reached,
especially on the quantum state [13, 14, 15] and the uncertainty principle [16]. Therefore, taking a step
back, anyone who studies in the sphere of the fields grounded on quantum theory confronts two inherently
philosophical fundamental questions: i) what is the physical status of the uncertainty principle?; and ii) what
is the physical status of the quantum state?
In the literature, since the works on the uncertainty principle have been positioned from an operational
(definition) perspective [16], they have unavoidably given rise to either a measurement based [1, 5, 6] or a
statistical interpretation of it [17, 18]. Eventually, as a result of these attempts, the dynamical relation of the
uncertainty principle with the quantum state has been lost; thus, it has been a barrier to giving an ontological
content to the quantum state. Indeed, quantum states in textbooks are taken as tools so as to calculate
the expectation value and to organize the measurement results of some operators (see, e.g.,[19]). Even if
the quantum state has taken a wider content in the scope of the quantum information and computation
theory, it is still devoid of a consistent ontological content [20, 21] and other works have not taken the
dynamics of the uncertainty principle into account [22, 23]. In the present work, as the primary intention,
a conceptual frame is constructed which connects the two questions stated above and merges them in a
consistent interpretation. To reach this aim, Sec.2 first unearths and then criticizes two inveterate conjectures
underlying the controversial arguments and debates within these questions which are taken into account
unintentionally. One of these is that "there is an operational-based prior space-time frame in which events
evolve continuously" and the other, related with the former, is that "events are understood based on a pure
two-valued logic of rational-reason". After constructing this conceptual frame, Sec.3 presents the physical
status of both uncertainty principle and quantum state consistently in a physical content. Sec.4 summarizes
the results and discusses related subjects in the scope of the new conceptual frame, such as the time operator
and the realization of a physical event.
2 Two conjectures relying on the foundation of physics
A complete and satisfactory description of the state of a physical event, in the classical vein, should fulfill the
demanded information of what exactly happens at any point in space at any instant of time [24]. This very
exhaustive statement implies a continuous description of the physical event into the space-time domain (or
frame) covered by its evolution. At the same time, such continuity reveals a continuous causal description of
that event in terms of the related differential equation in such a way that the future-state of the event in
space-time is determined by a past-domain of space-time. Through this causal description, whenever one
asks where and when the event positions, which is the demand of its realization, it is said that it is exactly
there-place in space and there-instant in time which can be called a kinematical realization. In addition, this
demand requires a continuous space-time realization; that is, the realization of the event must be well-defined
over a continuous pattern. Hence, the realization is continuous and kinematical. Whenever one asks what
that event is, from its continuous kinematical realization, the given answer is that it is, as an aggregation of
matter, right there in space-time without giving any reference to its other space-time region. Furthermore, in
the first place, if this aggregation of matter has existed in an interval of time, it is also existent in an arbitrary
portion of this interval. Thus, we can say that the wholeness of a speck of matter is immune to the division
of time. In the second place, an arbitrary portion of that aggregation of matter shows exactly the same
dynamical and existential property as its whole, which means an arbitrary division of the volume, so space
does not affect the characteristic property of matter [25]. Hence, the lapse of time flows per se and space is a
kind of locus for matter. This affair of matter against space-time is indeed an implication of its continuous
and kinematical realization. Summarizing this description, we want to rephrase it in two suppositions for the
sake of clarity: a continuous kinematical description of an event in nature presupposes (i) a prior existent of
space-time; and (ii) a physical event is an amount of matter which takes place exactly right there in space-time.
One can straightforwardly infer from this perspective that an aggregation of matter, or a physical event
settles in principle into the space-time frame independently from the dynamic of that frame. Therefore, one
always explains the dynamic of a physical event necessarily by the changes in its position in the flow of time;
thus the continuous kinematical description becomes the foundation of the dynamic of the vent. Another,
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but the most important, result is that one cannot construct from this description the inductive or causal
character of the dynamic of physical events due to both not referring to another region of space-time and the
immunity of the events to the division of space-time. Thus, we say that the dynamic of a physical event is
conceptually unconnected to its continuous kinematical description. Indeed, if one contemplates in light of
this type of realization and describes a physical event at every point of space-time without referring to both
its past and its future, the event stays alone on its own right into that space-time point, and thus its dynamic
is fully uncertain. On the other hand, there is a rigid causal character of the dynamic in the language of the
continuous path equation of the event. we indeed ascribe a mere continuous dynamic to the event by its path
function such that, at every point of space-time, it has a well-defined momentum which is continuous over
the path. In addition, the explanation of a physical event in the context of its dynamic is given in terms of
its space-time coordinates and interaction with the environment, which is again given in term of space-time
coordinates. Therefore, the description of the event from the perspective of its dynamic is constructed on the
basis of continuous space-time coordinates. As a result, regarding the observer’s measurement of space-time
coordinates, the kinematic of the event is conceptually uncertain in respect to continuous dynamic of the
event, because it is impossible for the observer to say that the event is right there in space-time so long as it is
evolving continuously. It is surprisingly seen that there is a mutually exclusive relation between the continuous
kinematical description and the continuous dynamical description. Throughout this classical description, on
one side, there is motion or the field of the interaction as an event, and on the other side, there is space-time
as a stage. However, when relativity theory is taken into account, the description must be changed in some
manner. According to (special or general) relativity theory, space-time has a relational character and takes
its shape according to the distribution of matter through it. It is essential to emphasize that the revolution
from the absolute to the relational conception of space-time is a consequence of the operational definition
[26]. Another remarkable implication of the theory is that the matter is not an additional something, say a
substance, existing in space-time. Indeed, as can be seen from the definition of the differential interval of two
space-time events, ds2 = guvdxudxv, the metric tensor of the gravitational field underwrites the conception of
both length and time-interval of a physical event. Therefore, by taking into account the operational definition
of space-time, one can conclude that matter does not have a meaning in its own right without the geometrical
structure of space-time. It can be thus inferred that neither matter nor space-time has a privileged and per
se meaning . From this fact one can also confidently jump to the characteristic relation between matter and
space-time, which is that extension is the essence of both matter and space-time. We now ask whether or not
relativity theory changes the continuous kinematical (and dynamical) description. From the perspective of
relativity theory, we leave the notion of absolute space-time and any kind of privileged relationship between
matter and space-time. However, it would be deception if one thought that the notion of "a prior existence
of space-time" is accrued from the notion of "absolute space-time" because the issue is not if there is a prior
existence of space-time on its own right, but how we take it into account of the description of a physical event.
Therefore, whenever one determines the event in light of the operational definition, one always observes it
right there in space-time from one’s reference frame. This precisely explains why we describe the dynamic of
the event in terms of space-time coordinates. In addition to this, since we hold the notion of matter to be
immune to an arbitrary division of space-time in the context of relativity theory, it is evident to say that the
notion of an operational-based prior existence of space-time remains valid. In conclusion, we want to point
out that relativity theory has not changed the conceptual description given above except for the fact that the
geometrical character of space-time is connected with the state of matter. It is thus important to grasp how
a physical event seems through the windows of these two classical theories. In this case, we define a physical
event in a way that:
(i) it is of an aggregation of matter which is meaningful in term of space-time coordinates, giving rise to
a continuous dynamic of these coordinates; and
(ii) it is immune to an arbitrary division of space-time coordinates, giving rise to a continuous kinematical
description.
In this picture, a physical event is a passive geometrical structure which reacts to its environment through
space-time and curiously enough, this point of view has been retained in the foundations of quantum theory.
Nevertheless, the mutually exclusive character of the kinematic and dynamic have been revealed in quantum
theory and both Bohr’s complementary argument and the uncertainty principle have served confidently as
the declaration of that mutual exclusivity (see, e.g., [27, 28]). However, the truth is that both Heisenberg and
Bohr had made their comments on the foundation of quantum theory relying upon the classical definition of
an event just given above. While Bohr had reached his complementary principle, the operational definition
had led Heisenberg to remove the notion of orbital from atom theory and to reach a statistical interpretation
of the uncertainty principle[1].
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Another conjecture underlying the foundation of physics is that events in nature can be interpreted, and
thus understood, based on a mere two-valued logic of rational reason, which will be abbreviated hereafter as
the fallacy of rational reason. What we mean here deliberately by term "rational reason" is that:
(i) it is based on the three fundamental laws of logic which are the principle of identity, ((∀x)(x = x)),
the law of contradiction, (¬(p ∧ ¬p)), and the law of excluded middle, (p ∨ ¬p);
(ii) the transitive property of an equivalence relation R is always valid, i.e., if pRq and qRr then pRr
[29].
We want to rephrase the principle of identity as the reflexive property of the events, law of contradiction as
the impermeable notion of the events and the transitive property as the ratio-nal relation of the events which
is the cause of why we use rational reason. The lack of time in the laws and transitive property serves as
the main property of rational reason, which is that the elements of rational reason have solid distinctive
notions, i.e., they conserve their contents during any logical process. According to the continuous kinematical
description of physical events, an aggregation of matter is right there and only right there with immunity to
the division of space-time and without referring to any other region of space-time. These properties of events
provide the rational reason for taking them as solid geometrical structures existing per se at every point of
space-time. For the sake of concreteness, we can see, for example, how such a perception manifests itself
on the interpretations of the well-known double-slit experiment. Firstly, one slit is open and a pattern of
electrons is detected on a screen in terms of intensity, say I1. Next, the other, but not the first, slit is open
and the same detection for electrons is recorded as I2. In the third case, we want to predict the pattern of the
electrons on the screen again in terms of intensity if both slits are open. According to the conceptualization
of rational reason, electrons are an aggregation of matter residing in space-time, or better said, are passive
geometrical structures enclosed by a finite volume of space flowing through time, and they conserve their
(external passive geometrical) character during their evolution through space-time. Therefore, in the third
scenario, the intensity of the resultant pattern should be a ratio-nal accumulation of those of the previous
scenarios: I3 = I1 + I2. In other words, the constituents (I1 and I2) already existed in accordance with the
continuous kinematical description, before the existence of the whole (I3), and they constitute the whole
as a synthesis, keeping their physical character. It is crucial to understand how rational reason achieves
this result: (1) according to the reflexive property, electrons are the same electrons during their evolution;
and (2) taking the continuous kinematical description into account, they satisfy the distinctive notions of
events; and thereby, consequently, (3) they obey the law of the excluded middle. Under these conditions, it is
straightforward to suppose that:
proposition-1. if the electrons-α pass through the first slit and hit the P-region of the screen, and
proposition-2. if the electrons-β pass through the second slit and hit the P-region of the screen then
result: the intensity I3(P ) at the P-region is electrons-α + electrons-β,
which is a direct implication of the rational relation of events. However, the double-slit experiment tells
us that this implication is not true. The revision we make in favor of the experiment is to abandon the
notion of (point) particle of electrons and assign them wave-property to explain the result in case of opening
both slits. But when we improve the experiment such that the electrons are released from the source one by
one, we detect each time the electron as a speck on the screen, from which we surely understand that an
electron is not a kind of ubiquitous wave just like a wave propagating through the water. As is seen from
this example, the concepts of both the continuous kinematical description and the fallacy of rational reason
usually intertwine in the explanation of any physical event, and thus result in a duality about the nature of
physical events like the wave-particle duality in the double-slit experiment.
Curiously enough, the authors of the EPR argument [30] also grounded their physical reality criterion upon
continuous kinematical description when they criticized the completeness of quantum theory. In their paper,
the authors stated the physical reality criterion as such [30]: "if, without in any way disturbing a system, we
can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to one) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists
an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity (pp. 777)". After the authors had stated
their first inference, they claimed to show that the assumption of the completeness of Ψ-function, together
with the criterion, leads to contradiction. For this purpose, they have first assumed two systems, I and II,
which interact with each other for an interval of time and whose states have been known before interaction.
With the aid of the Schrödinger equation, they have presented two wave functions of the composite system
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according to two observables, A and B, of the first subsystem respectively as the following:
Ψ(x1, x2) =
∞∑
n=1
ψn(x2)µn(x1)
Ψ(x1, x2) =
∞∑
s=1
ϕs(x2)νs(x1),
where x1 and x2 stand for the variables describing the subsystems, and µn(x1) is the eigenfunction of A
with eigenvalue an and νs(x1) of B with eigenvalue bs. One can take the observable A as the momentum
and B as the position of the first subsystem. Now, according to the wave packet reduction, if the observable
A is measured and is detected with the value am then, after measurement, the first system is left in the
state µm(x1) and the second system in the sate ψm(x2). On the other hand, if the observable B is measured
resulting with the value br, then this time the first system is realized in the state νr(x1) and the second one
in the sate ϕr(x2). Bearing in mind that ψm(x2) is the eigenfunction of the momentum operator and ϕr(x2)
of the position operator of the second system, the authors have made the crucial comment [30]:
"As a consequence of two measurements performed upon the first system, the second system
may be left in states with two different wave functions. On the other hand, since at the time
of measurement the two systems no longer interact, no real change can take place in the
second system in consequence of anything that may be done to the first system. This is, of
course, merely a statement of what is meant by the absence of an interaction between the two
systems. Thus, it is possible to assign two different wave functions (in our example
ψm and ϕr) to the same reality (the second system after the interaction with the first)"
(pp. 778) [boldfaced belonging to us].
We can now give the EPR argument, which is that: (1) having started with the completeness of Ψ-function,
and (2) according to the physical reality criterion, and since (3) (the authors have inferred that) ψm and
ϕr represent the same reality, then one can predict both the momentum and position of the second system
with certainty, and thus, they are real simultaneously. This would seem to be an appropriate place to shed
light on how continuous kinematical description has been used in this conclusion. First of all, the physical
reality criterion states that a physical quantity is real and always real if it is predicted with certainty. This
is indeed nothing but only the expression of the continuous kinematical (or dynamical) description of the
physical quantities. What is more, the two different wave functions, that is ψm and ϕr, have been assigned to
the same reality with the aid of the operational definition, which again relies on the continuous kinematical
description as stated earlier. In the first place, when the observable A is measured and consequently the
second system reduces to the state ψm, it must be assumed that the momentum of the second system is real
and always real. In the second case, when the observable B is measured and thus the second system falls
into the state ϕr, similarly the position of the second system must be regarded as real and always real. This
is the background of how the two different eigenfunctions become representations of the same reality. It is
also the ground of locality, which entails that every interaction must be local due to the assumption that
every physical entity is some aggregation of matter having a geometrical structure. We want to emphasize
the fact that the two different eigenfunctions belong to the same reality is not only a direct consequence of
the non-disturbing measurement but also the continuous kinematical description, because there is no way to
conclude that, after measurements, both the eigenfunctions represent the same reality without accepting the
continuous kinematical (and dynamical) description. However, there are, for example, entangled systems
disproving the EPR argument [31]. This is also evidence against the ground of the physical reality criterion,
i.e., the concept of the continuous kinematical description, and thereby the generality of locality.
2.1 The criticisms of the conjectures and restatement of the physical event
The two conjectures examined above come unavoidable into any description of a physical event because our
minds acquire them naturally throughout our experiences over time. However, as it has been shown above,
any description of a physical event relying on these conjectures brings us to a duality within the nature of
the event even though there is no such duality in the event itself. If indeed there had been, then there would
not have been, on one hand, motion in the view of the kinematical description and realization of events in
the view of the dynamical description on the other hand. After all, we observe, for example, the emission
spectrum of atoms many times and each time as the same; and we detect the behavior of an electron, for
example, in an electromagnetic field many times and each time, again, as the same. In addition to these
facts, there are also some events that did not existed before, but exist now for a time, and will disappear a
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while later. This progress is actually the necessarily condition for talking about the existent of a physical
event. Therefore, there are factual (and some permanent) events in nature surviving throughout the physical
processes, i.e., with respect to their dynamics. In this case, we have to remove the continuous kinematical
description from the ground of the expression of a physical event in favor of these factual and permanent
events. The main characteristic property of this description is the immunity of a physical event to the division
of space-time. We should abandon this supposition and state that: it is impossible to preserve the notion
of the factual and permanent events against the arbitrary division of space-time. The other characteristic
property is that a physical event is an aggregation of matter having meaning in terms of space-time. This
supposition forces us to conclude that a physical event is nothing but an amount of matter characterized by
space-time coordinates. If one goes a step further, the event seems to be a local entity having a nonfunctional
(or passive) geometry. It was this supposition which allowed us to reach the rational accumulation of the
intensities in the double-slit experiment scenario. Giving wave character to the electrons is nothing but
disproving this supposition because whenever we append the wave character to the electrons, we destroy at the
same time their nonfunctional geometrical structure, and thereby they gain a functional geometrical structure,
ensuring destructive and constructive inference when they come into interaction. Therefore, we must also
leave this supposition and should state that: a physical event is a structural form. The term "structural form"
used here signifies a shape whose geometry is both determined and organized by the structural (or dynamical
and physical) properties of the event; thus, it is the source of the external geometrical shape. Every physical
event has this structural form, which is needed for the objective reality of the events. Otherwise, one will
have to ascribe physical properties of a physical event to its interaction with its surroundings, which means
the rejection of the objective reality. For example, according to orthodox interpretation of quantum theory,
experiments demonstrate whether electrons behave like particles or waves. This idea implies that the physical
properties of electrons depend on their interaction with their surroundings.
We wish to emphasize the fact that a physical event is neither a pure geometrical shape nor a mere
accumulation of matter and, by keeping its structural form, its external geometry is identified by its structural
properties which are functional. Due to their functionality, we call the structural properties the functional
faculties. Now, if one unifies the two statements above, a physical event obtains a definition with respect to
its kinematic, which is that a physical event is a structural form possessing a finite region of the space-time.
However, this definition is still deficient because it is a kind of frozen snapshot which does not include the
dynamic of the event. If there is no dynamic, there is no event, and hence no the perception of the event
because the dynamic is the source of the functional faculties of the event. For instance, it is the dynamic
giving existence, and thus meaning, to the wave property of electrons. To make the dynamic inherent in the
nature of the event, we must give reference to the past and the future of the event. This revision then implies
that a physical event is not an amount of matter taking place exactly right there in space-time. Once the
event includes the references to its past and its future, we confront something replaced. We don not here
synthesize the kinematic and the dynamic properties of the event; they are already inherent in the event.
Furthermore, they are not separated in the nature of the event itself such that one has no reality without the
reality of the other. Therefore, replacement is the existence condition of a physical event. In other words,
replacement is analytic to the nature of a physical event. We can now ask whether space-time is a physical
event or not. It is clear that space-time is not a physical event because neither space nor time has functional
faculties per se, and they are not observable as bare fact. They are always ascribed to physical events for
explanation. If this is so, do we destroy the unprivileged relationship between space-time and matter that was
stated before? The absence of a priority between space-time and matter is stated with respect to the observer,
and therefore, it has meaning from the perspective of the operational definition. However, here we are not
observing a physical event but trying to give it the conception best suited to its concreteness, kinematic
and dynamic. From the perspective of the observer, there is a realized event and this event appears to the
observer as having a finite region of space-time. Therefore, from the view of the operational definition, there
is still no privileged relationship between the (realized) event and space-time. We conclude that space-time is
the mode (or condition) of our observation, not the condition in which the physical event survives.
According to this revised description of the physical event, can we still preserve the character of the rational
reason? Since we put away the view of a physical event being a passive geometrical structure, we cannot
preserve the impermeable notion of the event, that is, we cannot apply the law of contradiction any more
in general. Whenever, for example, an electron interacts with another one, the electron does not preserve
its geometrical structure during the interaction due to interference. This is why the linear summation of
intensities is not valid but that of the probability amplitudes is valid. Therefore, the law of contradiction
should be restricted, at least in the scale of elementary particles. In addition, as pointed out earlier, the lack
of time in the propositions of logic is crucial in the logical process of the rational reason. It is the lack of
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Figure 1: In this figure, we take place on the realized structural form of the physical event which has the region of
space-time (x0, t0), and we try to perceive the event without losing its given definition. In this case, we recognize, for
example, a moving physical object such that the realized structural form is the result of the replaced structural form
with both definite momentum variable and unspecified position variable (NY-Realized aspect), and at the same time it
is the source of subsequent replacement of the structural form with both definite position variable and unspecified
momentum variable (NA-Realized aspect). We attribute to NY-Realized aspect the pair of the dynamical variables
{X(ti), P0(ti)} in order, and to NA-Realized aspect {P (tj), X0(tj)} in order. The dynamical variables X and P
correspond to the position variable and the momentum variable, respectively.
time, for example, which allows us to think that, if the momentum of a physical event is real by predicting
with certainty then it is always real (in the lapse of time). Thus, in order to stay consistent with the nature
of physical events, we should state the propositions about the events as the function of time, if, for example,
they are related to the dynamic of the events. Finally, the current rational reason is based on the continuous
kinematical description and does not include the dynamical character of the events. However, the kinematic
of physical events has no meaning without their dynamic, as stated above. Therefore, a revision of the current
basis of rational reason is naturally needed. For such a purpose, new logical systems have been offered by
taking the dynamical properties of the events into account [32, 33].
3 The conceptual frame for the foundation of the quantum theory
Our main concept is the physical event, which has been derived in the criticisms of the conjectures such that:
it is a replaced structural form possessing a finite region of space-time. Without losing this definition, one can
now stand as an observer and seek how a physical event appears. From the reference frame of the observer,
observing a physical event means that the structural form is a realization having a finite space-time. Therefore,
we always observe the structural form which has become realized. Taking into account the replacement
character of the structural form, and if we stay with the realized structural form, we recognize that:
(i) A physical event is the result of the replacement of a structural form having dynamical properties.
We call this aspect not-yet realized (in short, NY-Realized), referring to the past of the event.
(ii) At the same time, a physical event is the source of the subsequent replacement of the structural form
having kinematical properties. We call this aspect not-anymore realized (in short, NA-Realized),
referring to the future of the event.
This is the general conceptual frame of the physical event, and we have depicted it in Fig.1. However, this
concept still does not fulfill the requirement of those events being subject to physical science, because the
investigation of a physical event in the context of physics is possible only if some invariant(s) is (are) inherent
in its dynamical nature such as the conservation of energy and momentum. Hence, if we restrict the physical
events to those of physics, an exhaustive and comprehensive definition of a physical event can be given as
follows:
Definition 1 A physical event is an invariant replacement of a structural form, possessing a finite region
of space-time.
The picture given in Fig.1 can be considered also for this definition. Ignoring the time dynamical variable, we
describe, as an example for the sake of concreteness, the motion of a physical event (object) as follows. it
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seems from the perspective of the NA-Realized that the dynamical variable momentum has to be determined
so that the evolution of the structural form should result in the present (realized) state of the physical event,
that is, the space-time localization, (x0, t0) which is the possessed region of the space-time of the (realized)
event. Therefore, we attribute to the NY-Realized aspect the pair of dynamical variable {X,P0} in order,
where subscript "0" shows the determined character of P . Similarly, from the perspective of NA-Realized, this
present (realized) structural form should be the source of the subsequent replacement of the structural form
such that it has a specified position variable with an unspecified momentum variable. Thus, we reasonably
attribute to the NY-Realized aspect the pair of the dynamical variable {P,X0} in order, where the subscript
"0" shows the determined character of X. We will return to this point when arguing the uncertainty principle.
Without losing the general scope of quantum theory, energy conservation can be taken as the general
invariant inherent in the nature of physical events. Hence, the two aspects of the physical event are
interconnected with energy conservation. One can characterize this invariant by a variational principle. The
NA-Realized and NY-Realized aspects of a physical event reveal naturally the non-commutative character of
the evolution of a physical event. The justification of this interpretation can be seen in terms of Liouville’s
equation:
dA
dt
= ∂A
∂t
+ 1
i~
[A,H],
where A is a physical variable. Indeed, if the physical variable does not explicitly depend on time, then its
evolution manifests itself according to the invariant of the event, that is, Hamiltonian of the event, which
consists of the non-commutativity character.
In the scope of quantum theory, what concept can be attributed to this notion of the structural form? Our
first requirement is that it should unify the dynamical and kinematical perspective of the physical event
itself. In other words, both the NY-Realized and NA-Realized aspects of the structural form should merge
into the concept in such a way that the structural form preserves its unity. Our second requirement is that
the concept not force us to the continuous kinematical description. According to this description, as stated
in Sec.2, a physical event is meaningful only in terms of space-time coordinates (x0, t0), and it is immune
to the indefinite division of space-time. This approach, in addition to giving an operational definition to
the event, forces us to consider that the event is a continuous kinematical and dynamical realization of an
aggregation of matter, which results in a duality in the nature of the event. Furthermore, from the window of
this approach, the dynamical and kinematical properties of the physical event have to be real in the course
of a continuous evolution. However, this induction contradicts with the fundamental principle of quantum
theory, that is, Planck’s hypothesis that the absorption and emission of energy are discontinuous. Therefore,
we have to refrain from such a continuous realization of the physical properties of the event. It then seems
that the best candidate satisfying these two requirements is the density matrix of a quantum system. Indeed,
one can represent the density matrix in the different representations (or descriptions) which have the same
eigenvalues, and these representations are connected to each other with a unitary transformation[34]. As
is well known, the space of the position variable is connected to the space of the momentum variable by
Fourier transformation, that is, a unitary transformation. Hence, the structural form of a physical event can
be interpreted as the density matrix of the event, which is also the quantum state.
We now proceed to embed the eigenstates and eigenvalues of physical observables into this picture from
a ontological perspective. It has been customary to interpret the eigenvalues as the only realized values
of the corresponding observables [4, 35]. In other words, a physical operator realizes itself only in one of
these eigenvalues. It is obvious that this is an imposition of the measurement perspective. However, we have
stated before that the measurement perspective relies on the operational definition, which is fraught with
the conjectures given in Sec.2. For this reason, in addition to other evidence such as the polarization of
light, we reject this interpretation. In the case of the polarization of light, we assume a monochromatic plane
wave moving to the positive z-direction and being polarized in the xy-plane by making an angle θ in the
x-direction. We measure the intensity of the wave at various values by means of an analyzer according to how
its optical axis is positioned. If its optical axis makes the same angle as that of the wave, we then measure
the intensity in full. This means that the components of the polarization of light along the x-direction and
y-direction manifested themselves simultaneously as a whole in the measurement. Therefore, to comprehend
such situations in the picture, the eigenvalues of an observable should not be interpreted according to the
measurement perspective. Instead, they are the contents of the possible eigenstates which can be entitled as
modes. Hence, we can make the following definition for the eigenvalues:
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Definition 2 The eigenvalues of a physical observable are the contents of the modes of the observable
contained in the structural form .
According to this definition, a structural form can contain a superposition of the eigenstates, and thus, the
eigenvalues of an observable. This definition is compatible with the reality of a physical event[20]. Similar
to the polarization of light, for example, the superposition of the modes of the spin operator Sz with equal
weight gives new modes either along the x-direction or y-direction.
From this perspective, the functionality of dynamical variables imposes itself as a fact inherent in the
structural form. This is the specific behavior of dynamical variables, for instance, the vectorial behavior. As
another example, the functionality of energy enables the destructive and instructive inferences of electrons.
Thus, we cannot assume physical objects, just like an aggregation of matter having a passive geometrical
shape. The modes contained in the structural form determine, for example, both the energy extension and its
functionality when the structural form becomes realized. This conclusion is consistent with the interpretation
of the energy-time uncertainty presented in Refs. [36, 37]. As a special area of physical events, we can
ask what the physical objects are, in particular, the elementary particles like protons and electrons. The
permanent and stable existence of the elementary particles is their main character. Definition 1 of a physical
event tells us that the elementary particles are an invariant replacement of the structural form having a finite
region of space-time. In addition, if we look at Planck hypothesis, E = hv ⇒ E = h/T ⇒ ET = h, it seems
that the realization of the energy, or equivalently, a complete replacement of the structural form needs a
finite time interval which has already been stated in definition 1. Indeed, the hypothesis is a counter-factual
declaration of physical events against the continuous kinematical description. According to the hypothesis,
we can interpret the frequency as the quantitative determination of energy. In addition, since the extended
energy of the structural form cannot be "nothing", the space occupied by the (realized) structural form cannot
also be arbitrarily small without losing the (realized) structural form. it is now clear that an elementary
particle can be defined as follows:
Definition 3 An elementary particle is a permanent wave packet, or equivalently, a permanent frequency
packet such that its energy extension is defined by its frequency which is a superposition of the modes of the
energy contained in the replacing structural form. In short, if v is the frequency corresponding to the finite
time that is needed for the realization of the energy, then an elementary particle is a uniform replacement of
the structural form with the frequency v.
This definition is consistent with the general form of the wave packet, ψ(q, t) = A(x, t)exp(iS(q, t)/~). The
extended energy as the realization of structural form is not a mode of the energy observable, but is the
superposition of the modes contained in the structural form. Furthermore, since the replacement of the
structural form emerges according to the invariant, that is, the conservation of energy, then the realization of
the structural form should be characterized by the trace function such that:
Definition 4 Realization of a structural form is trace of the invariant, Tr(Hρ) = 〈E〉, where density matrix
ρ plays the role of the structural form.
According to this definition, the extended energy as the realization of the structural form is the expectation
value of the energy variable; thus, we can reinterpret Planck’s hypothesis in context of the realization of the
structural form again, like 〈E〉T = h, for an elementary particle. The time appearing in this reinterpretation
is the finite time needed for a complete realization of the structural form. In other words, it is the finite time
possessed by a physical event, which was stated in definition 1 of the event.
This conceptual frame is sufficient to merge the main questions, presented in the introduction, into a
consistent interpretation. They were these: i) what is the physical status of the uncertainty principle?, and ii)
what is the physical status of the quantum state? We have already determined the physical status of the
quantum state (i.e., density matrix) as the structural form expressed in definition 1. Now, we wish to express
how the uncertainty principle plays a role in the structural form. For this purpose, we focus on the picture
given in Fig.1. We have described that: (i) from the perspective of the NY-Realized, a physical event is a
result of the invariant replacement of the structural form having a determined momentum on the one hand;
and at the same time, (ii) from the perspective of the NA-Realized, it is the source of the invariant replacement
of the structural form having a determined position, on the other hand. A determined variable can be
represented, in general, by a positive operator-valued measure (POVM). We have attributed to the former
perspective the pair of the dynamical variables {X,P0} in order, and to the latter the pair of the dynamical
variables {P,X0} in order. If these two variables were compatible with each other, then their orders would
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seem exactly the same from both perspectives, that is, they would be {X0, P0} and {P0, X0}, respectively,
from the description perspective. In other words, they would become realized compatibly (or simultaneously).
However, according to the description of the physical event, this is impossible. This impossibility should
be read as a counter-factual declaration of physical events against the continuous dynamical description.
During a complete replacement, the structural form unifies in itself both perspectives according to its invariant.
This unification happens by means of a unitary transformation. Therefore, we conclude that the uncertainty
between the position and momentum variables arises as a physical character of the invariant replacement of the
structural form. In short, contrary to common sense[16], the uncertainty is not due to the measurement but
is ontological. This idea does not exclude measurement error, but rather, it implies a universal measurement
error within incompatible measurements. In other words, it implies that, independent from measurement,
there is no simultaneous continuous kinematical and dynamical description of a physical event if we don not
want to lose the notion of factual and permanent events. One can read the second term on the right side of
the Robertson-Schrödinger inequality [38, 39],
∆X2∆P 2 ≥ Cov
2(X,P )
4 +
|〈[X,P ]〉|2
4
as the ontological uncertainty entering into the measurement error.
How does the measurement seem from this conceptual frame? In the first place, we underline the fact that
an observation is an action of the observer from a reference outside a physical event. This means that the
observer tries to observe the realization of the structural form, i.e., Tr(Hρ) = 〈E〉. In the second place, if the
observer attempts to learn the content of the structural form, the observer first interacts with the event by
means of an experiment and then observes the realization of the event. Therefore, taking {Πk, k ∈ I} as a
set of POVMs, one measurement is the realization Tr(HΠiρ); thus, the measurement process is inherently
statistical. In addition, if we would present the density matrix of a physical event as ρ =
∑
i,j pij |ψi〉〈ψj |,
where the pure states {|ψi〉} are not necessarily orthogonal, then we would describe the state of the event
statistically because this density matrix is a mixture of reality (the sates {|ψi〉}) and the observer’s lack of
information (the probabilities pij) about the structural form of the event. However, the structural form of
a physical event in itself is a pure state because if it is not a pure state then it does not have an invariant
which unifies the kinematic and dynamic perspectives of the event. In short, a physical event does not have
two different structural forms simultaneously. Furthermore, if the states {|ψi〉} are not orthogonal then we
cannot apply the law of excluded middle categorically to the interaction of the event with its environment
because the notions (the states) are not distinct (orthogonal).
4 Results and Discussion
We have presented the uncertainty principle and the quantum state as two essential problems of quantum
theory. We have resolved the problems on the ground of a unification of the kinematical and dynamical
characters of physical events and then unified them as an invariant replacement of the structural form. We
wish to underline the result that the uncertainty between the position and momentum variables is inherent
in the nature of the structural form. An Understanding of the nature of this structural form requires the
revision of the ratio-nal reason. Because the current ratio-nal reason is based on the operational definition,
which relies on the continuous kinematical description, which always forces us to determine the content of a
physical event from the perspective of the operational definition by means of abstract concepts. We need a
new logic to unearth the content of the structural form (see, for example [32, 33]).
Another important result of our conceptual frame is that space-time is created as a result of the realization
of the invariant replacement of the structural form. This does not contradict with the results of relativity
theory about space-time because relativity theory determines a physical event from an operational perspective;
in other words, its object is not the structural form ρ but the realization of the structural form, Tr(Hρ),
which has an inborn finite space-time region. One can design an experiment to measure this finite time of
realization [23]. Therefore, the absence of privilege between the matter and space-time is preserved from the
operational perspective.
The notion of a (one) complete realization of structural form in our conceptual frame supports the possibility
of a time operator[40] having a domain [0, 2pi], which is another result of our conceptual frame. The time
parameter-t used in classical mechanics is based on the perspective of the operational definition which has a
domain (−∞,∞). However, treating this time parameter-t as a canonical variable is fraught with dynamical
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problems such as the impossibility of finding a Hamiltonian for the enlarged system consisting of the time as
the (n+1)th canonical coordinate [41].
The most remarkable result of our conceptual frame is that a physical event, as an invariant replacement
of the structural form, has a functional nature; in other words, it is not an accumulation of matter with a
passive geometrical shape, but it is an active shape such that its dynamical properties organize in unity,
the so called structural form. These organized dynamical properties manifest themselves by means of the
invariant. Two aspects, NY-Realized and NA-Realized, of the structural form suggest a non-commutative
geometry as long as one considers microscopical scale of physical events. The reason behind the need for
non-commutative geometry is related to the following question: why do the things around us seem as if they
are continuous and stable objects? If one considers a motionless object having 1gr mass and attains, for the
sake of simplicity, the Hamiltonian mc2I, then its realization is Tr(mc2Iρ) = mc2 = 〈E〉. The time needed
for a complete realization of the object is T = h/〈E〉 ≈ 10−39sec. This explains why the things around us
seem continuous, and as passive and stable geometrical objects. In this example, we assumed the motionless
object as an aggregation of matter having a passive geometrical structure, which means that the structure of
the object is non-functional. Therefore, non-commutativity is about whether or not the functional faculties of
a physical event manifest their functional character. If the realization period of a physical event and the
interaction time of the event with its environment are at the same scale, we then observe the effect of the
functional character of the variables.
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